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"WILLFUL PATENT FILING":




There is a continual search for commercially valuable genetic and bio-
logical resources. Biological prospecting, or just "bioprospecting," benefits
the creation of new pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, biotechnology, and crop
production. 1 Bioprospecting is an efficient means of obtaining biological
information, leading to decreased research and development costs. 2 When
this genetic and biological resource information is possessed by indigenous
peoples in its naturally-occurring form, it is termed "traditional knowl-
edge." Demonstrating the value of bioprospecting in traditional knowledge,
a study found that the base compounds in the majority of the top 150 plant-
based pharmaceuticals correspond with traditional medicinal knowledge. 3
Economic hardship and natural resource depletion can result when
property rights are granted to bioprospectors, and more often occurs in the
area from which the traditional knowledge was "harvested." Two case stud-
ies illustrate the problems that occur when property rights in traditional
knowledge are granted, the difficulties in combating the grant of these
rights, and the inadequacy of the current procedures available as a remedy
for the original holders of traditional knowledge. The first example in-
volved a U.S. patentee who obtained a patent on a strain of a common field
bean from Mexico. The second illustration comprised several patents is-
sued in both the United States and European Union (E.U.) relating to the
neem plant, an indigenous plant to India.
The "Enola bean" patent is one of the most discussed instances of a
patent issued on a plant species developed from the traditional knowledge
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Spring 2010; Notes and Comments
Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review; B.A. Biological Sciences, University of Delaware, 2007.
1. Kerry ten Kate & Sarah A. Laird, Bioprospecting Agreements and Benefit Sharing with Local
Communities, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 133, 144-45 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004).
2. See generally id. at 134.
3. See id.
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of an indigenous group.4 The U.S. patentee was a man named Larry Proctor
who, in the mid-1990's, purchased a bag of beans from a Mexican market
which he then planted and bred over several years. 5 He noticed a particular
strain of the bean that remained yellow through all four seasons. 6 Claiming
he developed a strain of the bean which did not change with regular sea-
sonal variations and effects, Proctor filed for, and was granted, a U.S. pat-
ent (the '079 patent) on all beans and hybrids developed from his strain 7 on
April 13, 1999.8 He termed his "new" bean the "Enola bean" after his
wife.9
After the '079 patent was granted, a request for reexamination10 was
filed in December 2000.11 Mexican farmers had been planting yellow bean
varieties called Mayacoba beans, also known as Azufrado beans. 12 While
the validity of the patent was reconsidered, Proctor actively sought to en-
force his rights to exclude others from using or selling yellow beans. 13 He
filed suit against sixteen U.S. bean companies for infringement of the '079
patent, 14 and also accused Mexican farmers of infringing his patent who
were selling yellow beans in the United States. 15 Proctor claimed royalties
for six cents per pound of all yellow beans sold in the United States. 16 As a
result of his claims, imports of the Enola bean from Mexico to the United
States dropped by ninety percent. 17 Over 22,000 farmers in Mexico depend
4. See Philip Schuler, Biopiracy and Commercialization of Ethnobotanical Knowledge, in POOR
PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 159, 174-
75 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, TRIPS and Traditional
Knowledge: Local Communities, Local Knowledge, and Global Intellectual Property Frameworks, 10
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 155, 175 (2006); Press Release, ETC Group, Hollow Victory: Enola
Bean Patent Smashed at Last (Maybe),
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/materials/publications.html?pubid=683 (Apr. 29, 2008).
5. Press Release, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, U.S. Patent Office Rejects Com-
pany's Patent Protectionfor Bean Commonly Grown by Latin American Farmers,
http://webapp.ciat.cgiar.org/newsroom/release_31.htm (last visited Feb 27, 2010).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Press Release, ETC Group, supra note 4.
9. Schuler, supra note 4, at 175.
10. A reexamination can be requested by members of the public to have the PTO reexamine the
validity of a previously issued patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2010).
11. Schuler, supra note 4, at 175.
12. Id. at 174, n.30.
13. Press Release, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, supra note 5.
14. See Danielle Goldberg, Jack and the Enola Bean, Dec. 2003,
http://wwwl .american.edu/TED/enola-bean.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
15. Press Release, ETC Group, supra note 4. Acts which constitute infringement are listed in 35
U.S.C. § 271. Importation of patented products is an act of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
16. Schuler, supra note 4, at 175.
17. Lorna Dwyer, Biopiracy, Trade, and Sustainable Development, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 219, 228-29 (2008).
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on the bean's sale for their own subsistence. 18
Proctor's patent was originally granted in 1999 despite a wealth of
printed publications depicting the same strain of bean that Proctor claimed
in his patent. 19 For almost ten years Proctor reaped the benefits of his
granted patent. During the reexamination procedure, the International Cen-
ter for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT)20 produced published evidence of six
varieties of yellow beans that were identical to the '079 patent both in color
and genetic markers. 21 Armed with the additional information supplied by
CIAT, the USPTO rejected the reexamined '079 patent for lack of novelty
and obviousness on April 29, 2008, after almost half of the twenty-year
patent term.22 Proctor subsequently appealed the USPTO's ruling to the
Federal Circuit, but that court affirmed the rejection. 23 Currently, Proctor is
pursuing two reissue applications based off of the '079 patent.
24
In contrast to the Enola bean patent in which revocation was ulti-
mately successful, patents on the neem tree demonstrate the difficulties
associated with invalidating a patent under the U.S. patent laws when the
prior art is traditional knowledge. Indigenous communities will often not
transcribe their practices into writing. Instead, the information is commun-
ally-held and passed down through generations, both by practicing the us-
age and through word of mouth.25
Uses of the neem tree, a mahogany plant indigenous to India, take ad-
vantage of nearly every part of the tree, from its roots to its leaves. 26 Par-
ticular extracts from the tree possess medicinal qualities, 27 some of which
have been described in Indian Sanskrit for over 2000 years. 28 Parts of the
neem tree are also used as antiseptics; the extracted oil from the tree can be
18. Id. at 229.
19. Press Release, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, supra note 5.
20. The International Center for Tropical Agriculture mission is to reduce hunger and poverty in
the tropical countries by improving agricultural research and natural resource management. Interna-
tional Center for Tropical Agriculture, Mission, Vision, Values,
http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/AboutUs/Paginas/misionvision-valores.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
21. Press Release, International Center for Tropical Agriculture, supra note 5.
22. Press Release, ETC Group, supra note 4.
23. In re Pod-Ners, 337 Fed. Appx. 901, 903 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("One of ordinary skill in the art
seeking to reproduce (and hopefully improve) the yellow beans that Proctor brought back from Mexico
would have done what he did: plant the beans, harvest the resulting plants for their seeds, planting the
latter seeds, and repeat the process two more times.").
24. See U.S. Patent App. No. 09/773,303; U.S. Patent App. No. 12/564,900.
25. See supra Section III.
26. Schuler, supra note 4, at 161.
27. Id.
28. Vandana Shiva, The Neem Tree: A Case History of Biopiracy,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/pir-ch.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
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found in products such as toothpaste and lamp fuel.29
The patents in controversy cover the use of neem seeds as a fungi-
cide.30 Beginning in the mid-1980s, countries have issued over a dozen
patents covering methods of extraction, the products of the extraction, and
uses thereof. Certainly these patents do not cover the neem tree as it is
found in nature and every country's patent law would prohibit the issuance
of such a patent. Rather, such patents may cover the method for obtaining
the extract, as well as the purified product obtained from the method.
U.S. patent 5,124,349 and European Union patent EP0436257 cover
extracts from neem seeds for use as fungicide. 31 Although both patents
acknowledge that neem seeds have been used as a fungicide for years, both
patents claim their process of obtaining the extract from the seeds provides
the added advantage of an increased shelf life.32 The validity of these pat-
ents is the subject of a legal challenge headed by Vandana Shiva, Magda
Aelvoet, and the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Move-
ments (IFOAM). 33 As a result of IFOAM's involvement and the informa-
tion of prior use it supplied, the European Patent Office (EPO) revoked the
EP0436257 patent held by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and W.R.
Grace. 34 It was the first patent revoked by the EPO due to claims that were
based on traditional knowledge. 35 The revocation did not come without
extensive effort and cost. The opposition and appeal procedures took over
ten years, enlisted the services of multiple non-governmental organizations,
and required great cost expenditure. 36 Further, increased demand for neem
tree products has elevated the cost of neem from 300 rupees per ton to 8000
rupees per ton, an increase of over one hundred and seventy U.S. dollars
per ton.37 Despite the revocation by the EPO, the United States continues to
29. Id.
30. Schuler, supra note 4, at 161.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 162.
33. Press Release, International Federation of Organic Cultural Movements, European Patent
Office Upholds Decision to Revoke Neem Patent, Mar. 8, 2005,
http://www.ifoam.org/press/press/2005/neem_patent-victory.php. IFOAM is an international organiza-
tion which participates in international negotiations at the UN, provides a market guarantee system for
organic goods, and develops organic markets worldwide. See, e.g., About the International Federation
of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM), http://www.ifoam.org/aboutifoam/index.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2010).
34. Fritz Dolder, Traditional Knowledge and Patenting: The Experience of the Neemfungicide and
the Hoodia Cases, 26 BIOTECH. L. REP. 583, 583-87 (2007).
35. Id. at 583.
36. Id. at 583-87; Schuler, supra note 4, at 167 (reporting that CSIR spent Rs500,000 to overturn
turmeric patent).
37. Schuler, supra note 4, at 165.
[Vol 85:3
WILLFUL PA TENT FILING
allow all patents on neem plant extracts to stand.38 The United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) found that, because the traditional uses
cited were not supported by published, written documentation, such uses
did not meet the requirements under U.S. patent laws to serve as prior art.
39
As will be discussed in more detail, 40 a U.S. patent is not invalid simply
because it seeks to claim something already in public use outside of the
U.S.41
This note examines the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS) Agreement within the World Trade Organization and why the
procedures currently in place are inadequate to protect the holders from the
exploitation of their traditional knowledge. Section I examines what is
meant by the term "traditional knowledge" and why its patenting may have
detrimental consequences to the original holders of the knowledge. Section
1I discusses how and why patents on traditional knowledge are able to be
obtained.42 Section III evaluates why the reexamination procedure for chal-
lenging the validity of an issued patent, as well as other proposed remedies
for protecting traditional knowledge, are infeasible and inadequate to pro-
vide a remedy to the original holders of the information. Finally, section IV
proposes that an amendment to TRIPS under Article 61 of the Agreement
which would require member countries to implement a mandatory criminal
procedure for those patentees found to have knowingly filed for a patent
that would be invalid based upon the prior use of traditional knowledge.
Additional suggestions for criminal sanctions and remedies are made with
the primary goal of deterring the criminal conduct while also providing a
realistic, achievable remedy for indigenous people.
I. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS
PATENTING
The terminology "traditional knowledge" covers several subject mat-
ter areas each having one thing in common: they consist of information
held communally by members of indigenous communities. 4 3 Despite its
38. Arewa, supra note 4, at 171.
39. Dorothy E. Schmidt, Postcard from the Reality-Based Universe: "Wish You Were All Here!"
A Meditation on the Relationship Between Science, Intellectual Property Law, and the Rights of Indige-
nous Populations in Plant Genetic Resources, 38 ENVTL. L. 315, 332 (2008). See infra section If.
40. See infra Section III.
41. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2002) (Prior public uses must occur within the United States territory
in order to serve as prior capable of invalidating a patent).
42. For the sake of convenience, when mentioning specific patent procedures the discussion will
be confined within the context of United States patent law recognizing that certain procedures will
differ even between signatories of the TRIPS Agreement.
43. See Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A TRIPS-Compatible
2010]
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colonial terminology, traditional knowledge is not static; it continually
evolves and develops over time44 and covers a wide range of biological and
other cultural knowledge.
45
"Biopiracy" is the term used generally to describe the acquisition by
industrially-developed entities of intellectual property rights, typically in
the form of patents, over traditional biological knowledge originally held
by indigenous peoples in biologically diverse regions of the world.46 Ex-
amples of biological knowledge in which patent protection was sought
include hagen abyssinica, ayahuasca, basmati rice, and turmeric. 47 Biopi-
racy is said to contribute to the ever widening disconnect between devel-
oped and developing countries with the material and monetary advantages
derived from misappropriating this information contributing as such.
48
Beyond the monetary gap, indigenous people may also consider the use of
their knowledge as offending non-commercial and spiritual values, illus-
trating the lack of consideration for those interests and values by the pat-
entee.49
The pejorative nature of the term "biopiracy" arises from the lack of
compensation that is provided to the indigenous people that develop the
traditional knowledge. Biopiracy has come to represent any number of acts,
including the collection and use of traditional knowledge, as well as the
unfair free-riding on such knowledge through use of the patent system.
50
Free-riding occurs when patentees reduce the research and development
costs of new products by utilizing species the indigenous people have pre-
viously determined to be useful and effective, and then seek to patent a
related process of purifying the medicinally-effective product, the product
itself, or a process for using the product.
Large pharmaceutical companies are not actually trolling the tropical
rainforests searching for commercially valuable traditional knowledge from
indigenous populations. Most often, the knowledge is patented by "expatri-
ate scientists and resident inventors with access to industrial country patent
Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 140-41 (2005).
44. Krishna Ravi Srinivas, Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Note on
Issues, Some Solutions and Some Suggestions, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L & POL'Y 81, 84
(2008).
45. Arewa, supra note 4, at 164.
46. Graham Dutfield, What is Biopiracy? International Expert Workshop on Access to Genetic
Resources and Benefit Sharing, at I http://www.canmexworkshop.com/documents/papers/1.3.pdf (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010).
47. Dwyer, supra note 17, at 230.
48. See Srinivas, supra note 44, at 88-90.
49. See id. at 86.
50. Dutfield, supra note 46, at 1.
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offices."' 51 Nevertheless, the impact remains the same. Half the world relies
on traditional knowledge for their food supply.52 Natural resources and
other biological products provide the world's poor with eighty-five percent
of their needs, including food, fuel, shelter, and medicine.53 The source of
these products is local. 54 Local communities and local ecosystems are con-
tinually evolving and the balance which has been established by their con-
tinuous interaction can be easily disrupted. Biological diversity is a result
of the nexus between human interaction and local ecosystems; to not only
preserve, but advance, future diversity, conditions must be maintained
permitting those people who have nurtured the ecosystem to continue to do
S0.55 If intellectual property rights disrupt the balance previously main-
tained, the consequences could be deleterious for both the ecosystem and
the indigenous peoples who rely on it.
Beyond the direct impact that a patent may have upon the local in-
digenous communities lie the potential effects that overconsumption and
alteration of diverse ecosystems may have in the future. Biodiversity is not
static. The continuance of biodiversity is the result of dynamic interactions
within an ecosystem-competition among plants, consumption by animals,
natural disaster, and human interaction-which permit the environment to
evolve.56 Depleting one resource in an ecosystem modifies the balance of
competitive power as related to the rest of the resources. Preserving the
means by which we create biologically diverse resources must be an im-
perative concern because it is impossible to know what biodiversity we
may need in the future.5 7 For example, the genetic altering of food crops
may increase agricultural production in the short term.58 The availability of
genetically modified seeds with increased production capabilities pressure
indigenous communities to utilize those strains because of the increased
production and fortitude of the crops. However, monocultural farming
leaves crops susceptible to natural genetic modifications of parasites, such
as the E. Coli strain 0 157:H7 that contaminated cow meat and then spinach
crops, 59 that can have deleterious effects on a crop unable to resist a new
51. Schuler, supra note 4, at 168.
52. Rosemary J. Coombe, The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community Traditional
Knowledge in International Law, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 275, 278 (2001).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 279.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 278-79.
58. Id. at 278.




parasite.60 Biological diversity and "survival of the fittest" evolution only
prevails so long as the weak may be weeded out through traditional farm-
ing methods. 61 And when almost 1.4 billion rural people require traditional
biological knowledge just to eat, altering the delicate balance of human
interactions within a local ecosystem can have far-reaching effects.
62
II. DIFFICULTY OF PROTECTING TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE UNDER
CURRENT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SCHEMES.
Forums at the national, regional, and international levels have exam-
ined, and continue to address concerns over the protection of traditional
knowledge. 63 There is debate over the proper venue for protecting tradi-
tional knowledge. The options include the national laws of those countries
housing the information, the national laws of the countries patenting the
information, or more generalized international directives aimed at creating
a cohesive body of patent law.64
Internationally, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) sets minimum standards that all
signatory countries must implement within their national laws to protect
intellectual property. 65 The Agreement also mandates enforcement meas-
ures including import/export obligations 66 and criminal sanctions.67 The
developing and less developed countries have an extended period by which
time their laws must comply with TRIPS. 68 However, the overall level of
regulation is the same and mandates apply equally to all countries; this
imposes large costs upon countries that must start from scratch with intel-
lectual property schemes not existing previously. 69
Despite the higher cost of implementation and compliance for devel-
oping countries, the structure of the Agreement and the nature of the forum
persuaded developing countries to sign on due to expectations that costs
60. Coombe, supra note 52, at 278-79.
61. See id. at 279.
62. Id. at 278.
63. See Kate & Laird, supra note 1, at 137.
64. See id.; see also Hannu Wager, Biodiversity, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore: Work on
Related IP Matters in the WTO, 3 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 215-16 (2008).
65. Coenraad J. Visser, Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for Traditional Knowledge, in
POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 207,
207-08 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004).
66. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights pt. III § 4, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
67. Id. at art. 61.
68. Visser, supra note 67, at 208.
69. Id.
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would be offset by increased international trade. 70 The WTO operates to
advocate a global free trade market for the benefit of all parties involved in
international trading.71 While free trade theoretically should produce a net
benefit for all parties involved, competitive advantages and asymmetries in
power can affect the negotiation and implementation of international
agreements. 72 The departure from these theoretical assumptions is readily
apparent in the context of the negotiations behind the TRIPS. Specifically,
the northern developed countries possess much greater control over the
agenda in the WTO than the south and such imbalances of power can be
seen in the resulting agreement.
For example, the TRIPS Agreement does not address issues pertaining
to traditional knowledge while other forums have directly spoken on the
topic. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has taken note
of possible problems with traditional knowledge and drafted proposals to
ultimately deal with those issues.73 However, because membership in
WIPO is limited and dispute resolution is minimal, this forum has proven
ineffective in enforcing the intellectual property issues it addresses. 74 The
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) also addresses issues with tradi-
tional knowledge. The CBD is a legally binding international agreement
which sets regulations on genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 75
The goal of the CBD is to "balance[] sovereignty and the authority of na-
tional governments to regulate access to their genetic resources with the
obligation for them to facilitate access for environmentally sound pur-
poses. ' '76 While this seems a plausible goal, many countries, including the
United States, are not signatories to the CBD and need not follow its provi-
sions.77 The CBD also suffers from rather weak mechanisms of enforce-
ment.
The appropriate starting point for a full understanding of the contours
of the traditional knowledge dialogue begins with a discussion of the re-
70. Id.
71. Arewa, supra note 4, at 158.
72. Id. at 158-59.
73. See generally World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Revised Provisions for the
Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Policy Objectives and Core Principles, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/9/5
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipogrtkfic9/wipo grtkfic 95.pdf (Jan. 9,
2006); see also WIPO, Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore, WO/GA/26/6 available at
http://www.wipo.intledocs/mdocs/govbody/en/woga_26/woga_26_6.pdf (Aug. 25, 2000).
74. Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum Standards
Agreements, 23 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 867, 871-73 (2008).
75. Kate & Laird, supra note 1, at 135.
76. Id.
77. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter Conven-
2010]
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quirements for patentability under TRIPS. While all countries do not have
the same view on patentable subject matter, signatories must at least meet
the minimum requirements articulated in the TRIPS Agreement. For the
purposes of illustration, this paper will highlight and define these broad
requirements in terms of United States law.
Under TRIPS, all patents must possess industrial applicability, new-
ness, and inventive step, 78 respectively referred to as utility, novelty, and
non-obviousness in the United States. 79 The utility must be "specific" to
the particular invention being patented, not just a general utility that all
members of a certain inventive class possess.80 Therefore, only those in-
ventions which have real-world applicability can be patented.
Subject matter eligible for patent protection includes processes (meth-
ods), machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, or improvements
thereon.81 However, certain other subject matter is excluded from patent
protection, namely "laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas. '82 The underlying theory prohibiting such patents states if rights
were granted to laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas, such
patents would stifle downstream innovation since fundamental concepts
like the theory of gravity or E=MC2 would be unavailable to the public.
83
Except in rare cases the subject matter of the patent and the original use of
the traditional knowledge are not in conflict. 84 This will be further devel-
oped in Section II(B) below.
A. Prior Art
The references used to prove that an invention is ineligible for patent
protection are called "prior art." Each subsection of section 102 articulates
what qualifies as prior art for purposes of proving anticipation (lack of
novelty.) 85 The same references can also be used to prove non-obviousness.
The statutory provisions guiding what prior art is relevant possess a strong
bias against invalidating a U.S. patent because of activity abroad. Such a
78. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, at pt. II § 5.
79. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.
80. See, e.g., In Re Fisher, 421 F.3d. 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
81. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
82. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
83. Id. at 126-27.
84. See U.S. Patent No. 5,401,504 (filed Mar. 28, 1995) (Use of Turmeric in Wound Healing);
Schuler, supra note 4, at 166-67.
85. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("printed publication[s] in this or a foreign country") with 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) ("printed publication[s] in this or a foreign country [and] public uses or on sale in this
country").
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bias can be explained by the desire to promote U.S. businesses and indus-
tries. 8
6
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), a patent is invalid if "the invention was
known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent."'87 Whereas prior "knowledge" or "use" of the
invention in the United States sufficiently bars patentability, identical
knowledge or use in a foreign country does not. Only foreign activity re-
sulting in the issuance of a patent or printed publication can invalidate a
patent in the United States.88 In fact, even knowledge that is held in the
United States but originated overseas is not relevant prior art.
89
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), a patent is valid unless "the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or
in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date
of the application for patent in the United States." 90 Like § 102(a), only
printed publications or patents in foreign countries can invalidate a patent
under § 102(b).
Similarly under § 102(g)(2), a patent is invalid if "before such per-
son's invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another
inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it."91 Again,
inventive activity occurring outside the U.S. is insufficient to show a lack
of novelty even though the same invention was already in existence.
Finally, under § 102(e) a patent is invalid if (1) a previous patent ap-
plication was filed for in the United States before the date of invention or
(2) a United States Patent was granted prior to the date of invention. 92
However, even if an international patent application is filed in the United
States and is granted as under § 102(e)(2), the patent still must be published
in English in order to qualify as relevant prior art. While this may not pose
any serious burden on outside applications because of the dominant use of
the English language, it still demonstrates the unwillingness of the U.S.
patent scheme to appreciate foreign inventive activity.
The very nature of traditional knowledge makes it extremely difficult
to invalidate a U.S. patent. The knowledge is typically communicated
86. Murray Lee Eiland, Patenting Traditional Medicine, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
45,48 (2007).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (emphasis added).
88. Id.
89. See Westinghouse Mach. Co., v. Gen. Elec. Co., 207 F. 75, 77-78 (2d Cit. 1913).
90. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added).
91. Id. § 102(g) (emphasis added).
92. Id. § 102(e).
2010]
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orally, and therefore lacks the requisite publishing required under § 102(a).
And although the subject matter may have been known or in public use
prior to the application for the patent, prior uses can only be invalidating
under § 102(a) and § 102(b) if they occur within the United States. "It
seems particularly ironic that the requirement of publication is not imposed
on domestic prior art in a highly literate society but publication is de-
manded from peoples whose knowledge has been orally transmitted.
'93
Finally, if an applicant for a patent claims the exact same subject matter as
the traditional knowledge, a prior invention cannot act as prior art when
created outside the country.
94
B. Novelty and Non-Obviousness
An invention must possess novelty and non-obviousness to be eligible
for patent protection. 95 An invention that is not novel is anticipated. "A
claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim
is found, either expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art refer-
ence. '' 96 Novelty is not a subjective consideration; inventors are presumed
aware of any and all prior art regardless of actual awareness. 97 So long as
the prior art is reasonably accessible it is capable of invalidating an applica-
tion for patent. 98
An invention is also ineligible for patent protection if it would have
been obvious to create the invention in light of what has come before it.99
The non-obviousness requirement prohibits the grant of a patent, despite
the fact that the invention is not identically disclosed in the prior art, "if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains." 100 Therefore, obviousness is ad-
judged from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the particu-
lar field of technology.
There are several key differences between the two analyses. Lack of
novelty must be proven by a single prior art reference containing the iden-
tical invention. The prior art need not claim the same invention; it is suffi-
93. Coombe, supra note 52, at 283.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).
95. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
96. Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 814 F.2d 628,631 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
97. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
98. Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 453 F.3d. 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
99. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
100. Id.
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cient just that the invention be disclosed in some respect. In comparison, an
invention may be obvious in light of one or more prior art references. 101 If
the person having ordinary skill in the field of technology would be moti-
vated to combine multiple prior art references, or the prior art references
teach that individual to combine the prior inventions, the combination of
prior art references is obvious if such combination produces the expected
result. 102 If the combination of prior art references produces an unexpected
result, then the invention is non-obvious.1
03
When considering relevant prior art, novelty is assessed without re-
gard to the particular inventor or a "reasonable person" who might be
aware of the prior art. Patentees are presumed to be aware of all prior art
references. Therefore, ignorance of a prior invention or publication is not a
defense to lack of novelty. Obviousness is assessed from the point of view
a person having ordinary skill in the particular field of art. An invention is
obvious if, in light of the information such a person would possess, they
would find it obvious.
Applying these standards used to evaluate the novelty and obviousness
of an invention, it is evident that some of the patents on traditional knowl-
edge will not be invalidated as lacking novelty or non-obviousness. 10 4 For
example, a plant, as found in nature, is unpatentable subject matter because
it is naturally occurring and lacks any human input. However, there are
three ways to obtain patent protection over living things: purify a naturally
occurring substance found within the organism, develop a new use for the
living thing (extracted or original), or genetically alter the species. 105 Puri-
fication of naturally occurring substances enable the inventor to obtain a
patent covering the purified substance under the subject matter of § 101, a
"composition of matter." 106 A patent may also be sought on the proc-
ess/method of extraction, under a § 101 method patent. 107 Thus, while pat-
enting the naturally-occurring plant is prohibited, the active substances,
processes for obtaining such substances, and methods for uses thereof, may
be within the purview of current patent laws.
101. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1504.03(II)(A) (8th ed., rev. 6 2007) ("A
rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) would be appropriate if a designer of ordinary skill would have been
motivated to modify a primary reference by deleting features thereof or by interchanging with or adding
features from pertinent secondary references.").
102. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
103. Id. at416-18.
104. The utility of an invention based upon traditional knowledge is usually not an avenue pursued
to invalidate a patent because the very reason the original holders and patentees find such knowledge
valuable is because it is useful.
105. Schmidt, supra note 39, at 340.
106. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
107. Schmidt, supra note 39, at 327.
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Patents can be issued on "food crops."' 108 By crossbreeding plant spe-
cies or genetically modifying the plants, an inventor creates a new strain of
food crops which are eligible for patent protection because that particular
strain is not produced in a natural environment. 109 This was the means by
which Larry Proctor obtained a patent on his Enola bean. Even a valid pat-
ent issued for a genetically-altered strain in the country of origin (where the
indigenous communities reside) does not prohibit use of the naturally-
occurring strain. 110 Therefore, traditional knowledge holders can never be
prohibited from using the natural resources they have been using even if
patents have been granted based upon their traditional knowledge How-
ever, if the indigenous farmers are using a genetically-altered strain, their
use constitutes patent infringement, regardless of intent or knowledge, be-
cause infringement is a strict liability offense.Ill
III. INADEQUACY OF REEXAMINATION AND OTHER SUGGESTED
SOLUTIONS AS A REMEDY FOR MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
Once a patent has issued, the patentee obtains the right to exclude oth-
ers from "make[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented
invention, within the United States or import[ing] into the United
States."' 12 The right bestowed on the patentee is a product of national law
and only extends to the borders of the nation in which the patent was
granted. A U.S. patentee with a patent on a process for obtaining an extract
from neem could not prevent a person from utilizing the same method in
India without a patent in India. However, though the right to exclude may
only extend within that particular country, the effects of patenting and
commercialization of traditional knowledge can extend far beyond the terri-
torial limits of the country. 113 Many plant species are indigenous to one
area of the world. If a patentee obtains a patent in the United States involv-
ing the use of the species, his "right to exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention" allows the patentee to market and
exploit his product in the United States. Increased demand and increased
consumption in the U.S. may decrease the availability and increase the
price of the resource within the indigenous country. As discussed previ-
108. Id. at 326.
109. Id. at 327.
110. Id.at331.
111. In re Seagate Tech., 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en bane) ("patent infringement is a
strict liability offense....").
112. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
113. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 39, at 333.
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ously, supra Section II, the economic impact may also couple with envi-
ronmental concerns as well. Because of the potentially far-reaching effects,
cohesive traditional knowledge protection must be obtained.
There are two different manners in which the original holders of tradi-
tional knowledge can be protected. The two goals are not mutually exclu-
sive. "Positive protection" provides benefits to the communities holding
traditional knowledge by awarding them the profits from the commerciali-
zation of their knowledge. 114 "Defensive protection" schemes grant to the
traditional knowledge holders an intellectual property right which the hold-
ers can enforce against others attempting to use their knowledge. 1
5
The reexamination procedures are an example of a defensive-like pro-
tection mechanism. A reexamination procedure is a process whereby a third
party can request that a granted patent or claim in a patent be reconsidered
by the examiner to determine if it indeed is eligible for patent protection."
16
Reexaminations can be initiated by any member of the public and can take
two forms: ex parte1 17 and inter parte. 118 During an ex parte proceeding,
once the member of the public requests a reexamination they no longer
participate in the proceeding, leaving the remainder of the process to be
conducted between the patentee and the government.119 A person who files
a request for an inter parte proceeding continues to participate throughout
the process.120
According to USPTO's Performance and Accountability Report for
the Fiscal Year 2008, 680 ex parte requests for reexaminations were filed, a
number which has continued to rise from the 2004 figure of 441 requests
filed. 12 1 The number of inter parte requests filed in 2008 was 168.122 Most
requests are granted 123 and there is a high likelihood 124 that the patentee
114. Visser, supra note 67, at 212.
115. Srinivas, supra note 44, at 87.
116. 35 U.S.C. § 301,302.
117. Id. §§ 301-07
118. Id. §§ 311-18.
119. Id. § 305.
120. Id. §§ 314(b)(2), 315(b).
121. USPTO, Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2008, Table 13A: Ex Parte
Reexamination, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/coi/annual/2008/oai 05 wit 13a.html (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010).
122. USPTO, Performance and Accountability Report for Fiscal Year 2008, Table 13B: Inter
Parties Reexamination, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2008/oai_05_wit13b.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010).
123. Of 666 determinations on ex parte requests, 626 were granted. USPTO, supra note 123. Of
150 determinations on requests for inter parties proceedings, 142 were granted. USPTO, supra note
124.
124. Robert Saltzberg & Mehran Ajomand, Reexaminations Increase in Popularity, INTELL. PROP.
Q. NEWSL. Sept. 2007, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/12748.html (last visited Apr. 10,
2010) (approximately seventy-five percent likelihood in ex parte requests).
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will amend at least one of the claims in the patent. In twenty-six percent of
the ex parte requests, all the claims were confirmed; however, in only ten
percent of the requests was the entire patent thrown out during ex parte
proceedings. 125
Thus, while statistically reexamination may appear to be a viable op-
tion, the typical medium in which traditional knowledge is held and the
requirements for reexamination procedures make success unlikely. Initia-
tion of a reexamination requires a question of patentabilty based on a
printed prior art reference. 126 There is no possibility of a reexamination
based upon prior public use or knowledge. Even if such use were allowed
to initiate a proceeding it would be unhelpful to traditional knowledge
holders; U.S. patent laws limit prior art to public uses within the United
States. 127 Finally, reexamination can be costly. Parties would need to hire
an attorney admitted to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice, which can require financial resources unavailable to traditional
knowledge holders without outside assistance. For example, the South Af-
rican Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) spent approxi-
mately $11,000 (Rs 500,000) to overturn a patent granted on the use of
turmeric. 128
The patents issued on traditional knowledge demonstrate that the
"USPTO makes little effort to verify the prior art"'129 which leads to the
issuance of patents like Proctor's original Enola bean patent that never
should have been granted in the first place. Reexamination is an after-the-
fact means of protecting traditional knowledge requiring a granted patent
before a request can be filed and procedures initiated. Other options for
protecting traditional knowledge have been advocated which seek to pre-
vent the exploitation of traditional knowledge before the patent's issuance.
Such suggestions include: disclosure of origin obligations, contractual ar-
rangements, compensatory liability regimes, and possible sui generis sys-
tems of intellectual property rights.
A. Disclosure of Origin
Disclosure of origin requires all patents making use of traditional
knowledge to disclose in the application the location from where the tradi-
125. Id.
126. See35 U.S.C. §§ 301,311.
127. Id. § 102(a)-(b).
128. Schuler, supra note 4, at 167.
129. Id. at 168.
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tional knowledge was derived. 130 The requirement to disclose is triggered
by even the most minimal use of traditional knowledge and is said to in-
crease transparency in the patent system. 131 Furthermore, the requirement
would provide developing countries with a means to monitor developed
countries to ensure their compliance with the CBD. 132
However, a disclosure of origin obligation may still provide inade-
quate protection of traditional knowledge and the rights of the holders of
traditional knowledge. First, it is difficult to discern when a patent is based
upon traditional knowledge. 133 Thus, monitoring compliance with the obli-
gation would only be feasible when the "piracy" is blatantly obvious, 134 a
small hurdle around which patentees can draft claims. More importantly,
disclosure of origin standing alone provides no remedy to traditional
knowledge holders. 135 Individuals seeking to patent an invention derived
from traditional knowledge are free to obtain those patents so long as they
comply with the disclosure obligations. The proposed solution falls short in
that it fails to compensate traditional knowledge holders for the patentee's
use beyond mere acknowledgement of the origin of the information.
B. Contractual Agreements
Contracts can be negotiated between indigenous communities and pat-
entees providing benefits to both parties. These agreements are typically
called "benefit sharing agreements" or "biodiversity prospecting agree-
ments."' 136 The companies benefit because they gain access to genetic re-
sources and traditional knowledge. Demand for this access is fairly high
due to downstream usage in drug discovery efforts and other biotechnol-
ogy. 137 The indigenous communities, in return, may request monetary and
non-monetary benefits. 138 Monetary benefits include access fees or up-
front payments, as well as royalties and milestone payments if the resulting
product is commercially successful. 139 Non-monetary benefits include ac-
cess to scientific research and resources, education, and training. 140
130. Srinivas, supra note 44, at 91 n.46.
131. Id. at 92-95.
132. Id. at 92.
133. Id. at 91-92.
134. Id. at 96.
135. Id.
136. Kate & Laird, supra note 1, at 133, 147.
137. Seeid. at 144-46.
138. See id. at 151-52.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 151-52.
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An example of a successful benefit sharing agreement is illustrated in
the use a compound called P57 derived from the Hoodia plant.141 The San
bushman from the Kalahari desert have been using the Hoodia plant for
thousands of years to prevent thirst and hunger. 142 The CSIR began study-
ing the uses of the Hoodia plant without signing an agreement with the San
people. 143 The CSIR isolated a compound, P57, which it patented and li-
censed to Pfizer to use as an appetite suppressant. 144 Because the CBD
recognized the San as legitimate stakeholders in the revenue, the San were
able to negotiate with the CSIR to receive royalties and milestone pay-
ments. 14 5
These benefit sharing agreements are promising in that they benefit
both parties in the short and long term, both monetarily and non-
monetarily. However, one problem in relying on parties to make these
agreements is that the traditional knowledge is commonly used and pub-
licly available.146 If patentees do not need to personally access the informa-
tion from the indigenous people themselves, the bargaining power of the
community is greatly diminished. Further, these agreements are still the
product of national law and rely on those laws as a means to negotiate and
enforce the agreements. 147 A prerequisite to beneficial agreements between
parties requires that the laws of the nations must empower local communi-
ties to ensure fair agreements are made.
C. Compensatory Liability Regime
Under a model compensatory liability regime (CLR), traditional
knowledge cannot be patented. 148 Traditional knowledge is treated as
"technical know-how" which prevents any party from obtaining a patent
and thereby the power to exclude others. 149 Instead, the information is
placed in a "semi-common pool" of knowledge where the original holders
receive compensation for their contribution to the pool but cannot restrict
second-comers from using their contribution. 150 Second-comers can then
make use of the original holder's contribution to develop innovations them-
141. Id. at 146-47.
142. Id. at 146.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 146-47.
146. Id. at 156.
147. Id. at 155.
148. Srinivas, supra note 44, at 98.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 99.
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selves. Because traditional knowledge holders receive compensation the
free rider problem is thereby eliminated. 151
However, the communally-shared nature of traditional knowledge
makes it difficult to discern who should receive the compensation. Fur-
thermore, quantifying the value that the addition of the traditional knowl-
edge made to the overall patented invention would prove difficult.
Presumably the value would derive from the commercial value of the tradi-
tional knowledge standing alone but, as discussed previously, some holders
emphasize spiritual and non-commercial values in their knowledge which
are incapable of being quantified.
D. Sui Generis System
Recognizing that current intellectual property schemes provide inade-
quate protection should indigenous peoples seek intellectual property pro-
tection themselves, proposals for a system which specifically protects
traditional knowledge have been suggested. Countries like India, the Phil-
ippines, and Peru have already developed and passed sui generis systems
protecting their own traditional knowledge. 152 Sui generis systems seek to
remedy problems with traditional intellectual property regimes and "ac-
commodate the specificities and interests of [traditional knowledge] hold-
ers."153 For example, Peru's objectives in establishing the country's sui
generis system were:
(a) To promote respect for and the protection, preservation, wider appli-
cation and development of the collective knowledge of indigenous peo-
ples; (b) To promote the fair and equitable distribution of the benefits
derived from the use of that collective knowledge; (c) To promote the
use of the knowledge for the benefit of the indigenous peoples and man-
kind in general; (d) To ensure that the use of the knowledge takes place
with the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples; (e) To pro-
mote the strengthening and development of the potential of the indige-
nous peoples and of the machinery traditionally used by them to share
and distribute collectively generated benefits under the terms of this re-
gime; (f) To avoid situations where patents are granted for inventions
made or developed on the basis of collective knowledge of the indige-
nous peoples of Peru without any account being taken of that knowledge
as prior art in the examination of the novelty and inventiveness of the
said inventions. 15
4
Problems with implementation of a sui generis system are numerous.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 104.
153. Id.
154. Law N' 27811 of August 10, 2002, El Peruano, art. 5 (Peru).
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One issue is compatibility with TRIPS. 155 Signatories to TRIPS must im-
plement laws "consistent with the provisions of [the] Agreement."'1 56 In-
corporating provisions from the CBD, the agreement specifically
addressing traditional knowledge concerns, may prove difficult due to the
silence of TRIPS on the issue. 157 Further, the numerous different objectives
that a sui generis system would seek to accommodate may prove difficult
to implement. There exist many commercial, cultural, and spiritual objec-
tives which must be considered. These objectives span across customary
law and intellectual property regimes and finding an appropriate balance
between those interests may prove difficult, especially in an international
forum.
IV. TRIPS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
The TRIPS Agreement has proven the most effective avenue for im-
plementing internationally binding obligations regarding intellectual prop-
erty law. The structure and voting practices in the WTO, as compared to
the UN/WIPO, allow "package deal" negotiating.158 Developing countries
can agree to compromises benefiting developed countries in return for their
desired increased standards protecting traditional knowledge. 159 Although
arriving at a consensus within the WTO can prove difficult to negotiate, an
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement implementing a criminal sanction
shifts the current doctrine toward an ex ante scheme which effectively de-
ters misappropriation of traditional knowledge.
Articles 41 through 61 of the TRIPS Agreement enumerate the en-
forcement obligations of member countries. 160 Articles 41 to 49 list the
civil and administrative procedures and remedies and Articles 51 through
60 relate to border measure requirements. 16 1 Article 61 is the sole article
containing requirements for criminal procedures that signatories to the
Agreement must implement.' 62 Article 61 provides that:
Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be ap-
plied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or copyright pi-
racy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall include
imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent,
consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corre-
155. Srinivas, supra note 44, at 105.
156. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, at pt. I art. 8.
157. Srinivas, supra note 44 at 105.
t58. See, e.g., Fukunaga, supra note 76, at 874-75.
159. See, e.g., id.
160. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 68, at pt. III §§ 1-2.
161. Id. at pt. III § 4.
162. Id. at pt. III § 5.
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sponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also in-
clude the seizure, forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and
of any materials and implements the predominant use of which has been
in the commission of the offence. Members may provide for criminal
procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of
intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed wil-
fully and on a commercial scale. 163
While specifically providing for criminal procedures with regards to
trademark and copyright infringement, the Article makes no mention of a
mandatory criminal procedure for any violation of a member country's
patent laws. However, looking to the drafting history of Article 61 demon-
strates that such a law is not far-fetched. In fact, Article 61 was debated
back and forth during negotiations with one of the original drafts contain-
ing language that provided for criminal procedures in cases of willful "in-
fringements on a commercial scale of intellectual property rights concerned
by this agreement."' 164 Such language would have applied to patent infring-
ers. Indeed, certain participants made clear that they wanted to provide
criminal measures for any and all intellectual property infringement, re-
gardless of willfulness. 165 The proposed language ultimately included a
mens rea requirement of "willful" action along with the language "on a
commercial scale." This was introduced to limit the application and deter
what have been referred to as "professional infringers," not simply innocent
infringers.166 The drafting history of Article 61 demonstrates the particular
issues that should also be considered when contemplating a scheme to rem-
edy the failed protection of traditional knowledge. And although TRIPS
ultimately eliminated any mention of criminal sanctions for patent in-
fringement, TRIPS sets only minimal standards with which countries must
comply.
In addition to injunctive relief and awards of damages, several coun-
tries have criminalized patent infringement including Japan, the United
Kingdom, Germany and France. Under Article 196 of the Japanese Patent
Act the infringement of a patent or an exclusive license is subject to crimi-
nal sanctions. 167 Sanctions include imprisonment up to five years and fines
up to five million yen, or approximately $50,000.168 In fact, no private right
of action is available to the patentee in Japan because of the characteriza-
tion of tort law as criminal in nature, thereby placing exclusive control over
163. Id.
164. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 234 (1998).
165. [d.
166. Id. at n.28.




the trial with the Japanese government.169 In the United Kingdom, the U.K.
Patents Act provides criminal penalties for the falsification of register,
170
an unauthorized claim of patent rights,171 an unauthorized claim that a pat-
ent has been applied for, 172 and misuse of the title "Patent Office."'
1 73 Vio-
lations of any of these sanctions can result in a fine and possible
imprisonment for the falsification of register. 174 In Germany, any individ-
ual who, without consent, "makes or offers, puts on the market, uses or
imports or stocks for these purposes a product which is the subject matter
of a patent" shall be subject to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding three
years. 175 However, unlike the Japanese system which places exclusive con-
trol over the prosecution of patent infringers in the hands of the govern-
ment, such offenses are only prosecuted in Germany on the basis of a
complaint or if the authorities feel prosecution would best serve the public
interest.176 Finally, in France, criminal procedures are available for excep-
tional cases of patent infringement. For example, when patent infringement
prejudices the national defense, imprisonment up to five years may be ap-
propriate. 177 The knowing infringement of another's patent rights may
carry a two year prison term and up to 1,000,000 franc fine. 17
8
While these systems may increasingly deter potential patent infring-
ers, Article 61 specifically states that member countries may "provide for
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringe-
ment."'179 Unfortunately, traditional knowledge holders typically do not
obtain intellectual property rights (indeed, TRIPS recognizes only personal
property rights, not communal property rights) 180 in their traditional
knowledge so another's (mis)use of it cannot constitute "infringement" per
se. Therefore, an addition to the TRIPS Agreement should be made under
Article 61 implementing a mandatory criminal procedure, the initiation of
which does not require "infringement of intellectual property rights" based
on traditional knowledge but rather just an "infringement of traditional
169. Larry Coury, C'Est What? Saisie! A Comparison of Patent Infringement Remedies Among the
G7 Economic Nations, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1101, 1145-46 (2003).




174. Id. § 109.
175. Patentgesetz [Patent Act], Dec. 7, 1990 RGBI. II, at § 142(1) (F.R.G.).
176. Id. § 142(4).
177. Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [JO.] [Official
Gazette of France], Feb. 8, 1994, L. 615-13.
178. Id. at 615-14.
179. TRIPS Agreement, supra at 68, at pt. III § 5 art. 61.





The shortcomings of the current intellectual property regimes, as well
as the proposed solutions discussed supra, demonstrate that there are six
main objectives that must be addressed when protecting traditional knowl-
edge. These are: 1) coherent application across nations; 2) ex ante applica-
tion; 3) economic feasibility; 4) adequate deterrence; 5) not easily
circumvented; and 6) ability of indigenous people to grant consent and
thereby obtain compensation for their knowledge.
Under this new amendment, the criminal procedures would be manda-
tory for all signatories of the TRIPS Agreement. This would ensure a con-
sistent, harmonized body of law across all countries, both developed and
developing. To achieve this standardization, traditional knowledge must be
uniformly defined. Looking to the CBD, Article 8(j) refers to traditional
knowledge as "knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and
local communities."' 181 To ensure further uniformity, the same activities
undertaken by the traditional knowledge holders must be sufficient to initi-
ate the criminal procedure across countries. For example, whereas some
countries, like the United States, do not consider foreign prior use invali-
dating prior art, others do consider such uses. Traditional knowledge is
typically transmitted orally from generation to generation and is held col-
lectively. Therefore, to achieve the maximum level of protection of tradi-
tional knowledge, all foreign prior uses should be considered sufficient to
initiate the procedure. This prevents companies from end-running the pat-
ent system by filing in countries like the United States to avoid the prior
art. And although the amendment does not implement the same structures
as the CBD, a further benefit of implementing this amendment would be to
advance the integration of the CBD into the TRIPS Agreement given the
similarity in language.18
2
Further, traditional knowledge must be protected from exploitation ex
ante, that is, before the patent is granted. Otherwise, the time and resources
necessary to challenge the patent, either during reexamination or litigation,
are infeasible remedies for those most directly affected by the exploitation
of traditional knowledge. Likewise, the procedure must be economically
feasible for indigenous people to participate. A criminal procedure places
the cost of litigation on the government. However, traditional knowledge
181. Convention, supra note 79, at art. 80).
182. There has been discussion over whether the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD can be harmo-
nized. See Kate & Laird, supra note 1, at 137.
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holders should be given the opportunity to actively participate in the proce-
dure if they elect to, providing evidence of publications and prior use, or
other resources needed to charge and convict the defendant.
This can be achieved by providing traditional knowledge holders the
ability to initiate the criminal prosecution much like filing a request for
reexamination. This serves both the traditional knowledge holders' interests
and the public interest. First, holders will possess both commercial and
non-commercial interests in the knowledge. Commercial interests include
the higher cost of a product resulting from the increased demand due to its
commercialization, the value lost from their own sales of the products, or
any other monetary value lost. Non-commercial interests might include the
sustainability of the ecosystem from which the product is obtained, as well
as the spiritual and cultural significance some communities attribute to the
particular biological product. 183 Traditional knowledge holders should be
able to protect both areas of interest.
Second, this procedure also promotes the dissemination of informa-
tion. "Facilitated access" is encouraged by the CBD. 184 In order that a
prosecutor can show that a patent applicant filed with knowledge of the
traditional knowledge, it is in the indigenous community's best interests to
disclose their use. An international database containing all traditional
knowledge might be established, the contours of which lie outside the
scope of this article. Countries such as China and India are already estab-
lishing databases containing their indigenous communities' traditional
knowledge. 185 While the overall onus of the work in a criminal procedure
will be placed on the national governments, which will undeniably lead to
policing issues, countries rich with traditional knowledge can assist by
disseminating their communities' traditional knowledge.
This proposed system would mimic the criminal procedures proposed
in a recent directive passed by the European Union. The directive allows
intellectual property right holders whose rights have been violated to assist
in the investigations for prosecution. 186 While acknowledging that it may
be difficult to ascertain who the true holders of a particular piece of tradi-
183. For example, the ayahuasca plant is a South American vine used in Amazonian Indian rituals.
When a patent was granted to a U.S. citizen on a new strain of the plant, the tribe objected because it
gave rights to a sacred plant used in religious ceremonies. Schuler, supra note 4, at 170.
184. Kate & Laird, supra note 1, at 133.
185. Press Release, European Patent Office, Protecting Traditional Knowledge: India Opens
Online Database to EPO Examiners, http://www.epo.org/topics/news/2009/2009021 I.html (Feb. 11,
2009).
186. Press Release, European Parliament, Intellectual Property Rights: Criminal Sanctions to Fight
Piracy and Counterfeiting, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=200703191PR04284 (Mar. 20, 2007).
[Vol 85:31194
WILLFUL PA TENT FILING
tional knowledge are, the concern cannot outweigh the overall benefit of
preventing the misappropriation of traditional knowledge. In fact, all poten-
tial schemes to compensate and protect traditional knowledge holders
would have similar difficulties since traditional knowledge by its very na-
ture is continually evolving and is communicated orally within a commu-
nity. A modest procedure could be implemented in which the individual or
group who filed the request for prosecution would have to furnish proof
they do in fact possess an interest, monetary or non-monetary, in the sub-
ject matter of the patent or application.
Criminal sanctions also remedy the problem of inadequate deterrence.
Under current intellectual property laws, the only consequence if a patent
application is declared invalid based on prior art is denial of the patent.
And as discussed earlier, this can be easily end-run. Prior uses occurring
outside the United States, for example, do not invalidate a patent. And fil-
ing for a patent on a process or method of using the traditional knowledge
product eliminates the subject matter invalidity. By requiring that the defi-
nition of prior art include both domestic and foreign prior uses and institut-
ing a criminal procedure when a patent is invalid because of the prior art,
individuals seeking patents will be more hesitant to file for a patent when
there is the possibility that it is found invalid based of traditional knowl-
edge. Further, the indigenous communities would have greater access to the
legal system and may be able to police applications filed or patents granted
with assistance from organizations like IFOAM.
The drafts and negotiations of Article 61 indicate that criminal sanc-
tions were intended to deter "professional infringers." 187 To remain in line
with this understanding, the proposed amendment should require knowl-
edge of indigenous community's interest in the traditional knowledge be-
fore criminal procedures can be initiated. The scienter requirement ensures
that the innocent filing of a patent will not turn into a strict liability offense
subjecting the patent applicant to criminal sanctions.
Further, permitting holders of traditional knowledge to consent pro-
vides benefits to both parties. First, allowing the holders of traditional
knowledge to grant consent recognizes a pseudo-right, based on the labor
theory of property rights, in their own knowledge. Essentially, traditional
knowledge holders would be given the opportunity to license their informa-
tion without having to obtain a property right in the knowledge in the first
place. This comports with the CBD which recognizes original traditional
knowledge holders as legitimate stakeholders in intellectual property rights
granted on their knowledge while also eliminating the costs, time and need
187. See GERVAIS, supra note 167, at n.28.
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for patent prosecution. 188
Second, the consent clause makes that information available to the
public. While one goal of the amendment is to prohibit the exploitation of
traditional knowledge to the original holders' detriment, the public may be
better served when the progress of science or humanity is promoted by the
disclosure of such knowledge. Therefore, the ability to give consent satis-
fies both goals in implementing a new property regime; it provides protec-
tion to traditional knowledge while permitting the original holders of that
knowledge to benefit from its value.
The amendment to the TRIPS Agreement should contain the following
language:
Member countries shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to
be applied in cases where a patent is knowingly obtained, or an applica-
tion for patent is knowingly filed, without consent, and the subject matter
of the patent or application would be ineligible for patent protection un-
der Article 27 due to prior awareness or use of traditional knowledge.
"Traditional knowledge" shall be defined as any knowledge, innovations
and practices of indigenous and local communities involving biological
diversity or genetic resources. Criminal procedures may be initiated by
the member county's prosecuting authorities or by the filing of a request
by a third party, located within or outside the member country's borders,
who can demonstrate a monetary or non-monetary interest in the subject
matter of the patent.
The amendment would apply in the following manner. Consider the
Enola bean patent discussed supra, but without the publications discussing
the prior use of the Mayacoba bean. Proctor files for a patent on his geneti-
cally-modified strain of bean, knowing that it is the same strain of bean he
bought in a bag from Mexico. When the application is filed in the United
States, the USPTO examines the validity of the patent in light of the prior
art under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as well as considering prior uses of traditional
knowledge. Agriculture and farming techniques by the Mexican farmers
would fall under the definition of "traditional knowledge" as a practice of a
local community involving biological diversity. The Mexican farmers can
request that criminal prosecution be initiated if they become aware of Proc-
tor's patent application, since they can demonstrate a monetary interest in
their bean. They can also assist the prosecution by providing background
information about their prior public use. Once the request is filed, Proctor's
pending application would be suspended until it was determined whether
Proctor was guilty under the new criminal statute. While it is fairly evident
that Proctor's patent lacked any novelty over the prior use, other cases in
which traditional knowledge is used to develop "method" or "use" patents
188. Convention, supra note 79.
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may be more difficult to prove lack of novelty or non-obviousness.
B. Remedies
Fines and imprisonment would be proper sanctions for a violation of
the proposed amendment. Further if the crime is caught prior to granting of
the patent, the application should be denied; if the crime is not caught until
after a patent is granted, the patent should be revoked. These sanctions
might provide adequate deterrence to those individuals contemplating such
acts.
However, restitution to the victims of the crime should also be consid-
ered, not simply deterrence of the filing. Violation of the amendment could
require mandatory benefit sharing agreements be entered into by the par-
ties. The mandatory benefit sharing agreements give traditional knowledge
holders significant leverage to extract desired benefits. Under a pure benefit
sharing regime (without possible criminal sanctions), patentees have little
incentive to give in to negotiations with indigenous communities. However,
if failure to coordinate an agreement will result in criminal sanctions, the
traditional knowledge holders have greater leverage to negotiate for more
favorable terms. The traditional knowledge holders could agree to permit
the patentee to obtain a patent in return for royalties and milestone pay-
ments. They might also negotiate a system in which the returns to the
community are in access to research facilities and scientific testing to in-
vestigate communal genetic trends and diseases.
Should the holder feel that the use of their knowledge would offend
spiritual and religious values, as with the Ayahuasca plant, 189 their in-
creased bargaining power would permit them to refuse to negotiate an
agreement. However, a procedural mechanism must be put in place within
the WTO or CBD which requires the dissemination and use of the knowl-
edge when the potential benefits of commercializing that knowledge sig-
nificantly outweigh the non-monetary significance placed on that
knowledge by the original holders.
The possible benefits of an agreement must also be weighed against
the value of the resource in its natural environment. Refusing to come to an
agreement could result in over-consumption of the resource since the in-
formation would be available to the public and many people could make
use of the natural resource without an exclusionary property right. Coming
to an agreement with the potential patentee might also result in overuse if
the licensee is able to create a large enough demand for the product. Of
189. See, e.g., Schuler, supra note 4, at 169-70.
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course, within negotiations of the agreement the original holders might
limit the level of consumption of the resource in order to maintain the vital-
ity of their ecosystems. Whatever decision is ultimately made about the
utilization of the traditional knowledge, the most important consideration is
that the traditional knowledge holders themselves are one of the parties
who have a voice in the decision.
CONCLUSION
The traditional knowledge issue presents a difficult problem of balanc-
ing normative and economic/public considerations when determining what
level of protection, if any, is appropriate for the subject matter. On one
hand is the recognition and protection deserved by those groups who are
responsible for developing, testing, and determining the value of the tradi-
tional knowledge. While their contribution is undeniably great, a complete
ban of all intellectual property rights that appear to use traditional knowl-
edge runs counter to every intellectual property right scheme. Enabling
such people to "hoard" their information would stifle innovation that might
potentially benefit a large number of the population.
As the north-south divide becomes ever more apparent the member
states of TRIPS must be cognizant of the interests of countries that may not
be similarly situated. That recognition should be reflected in the articles
that are implemented into the Agreement. Traditional knowledge is the
backbone of a large percentage of the world population's livelihood and
must be protected to ensure that its continued use is available to those who
have been using it for ages. The current regulatory schemes and procedures
for protecting traditional knowledge are ineffective in certain respects that
mandate the implementation of a new procedure. Traditional knowledge
holders must be able to take an active role in the procedure without shoul-
dering the burden of combating those who seek to obtain patents. Once
traditional knowledge is protected from foreign intellectual property rights
and the original holders of the knowledge benefit from its commercializa-
tion, the misappropriation of traditional knowledge will be minimized and
the gap between developing and developed countries narrowed.
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